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It is commonly assumed in private value auctions that bidders have no information
about the realization of the other bidders’ valuations. Nevertheless, an informative
public signal about the realization may be released by a bidder while he learns
his own valuation. Using a simple discrete asymmetric ﬁrst-price auction setting,
we show that a bidder may indeed beneﬁt from the presence of an informative
signal about his own valuation. We characterize the optimal signal and show that a
signal is not beneﬁcial if it is too precise. The latter result carries over to a general
continuous asymmetric ﬁrst-price auction model. Finally, we use a speciﬁc signaling
structure with uniform distributions to show that signaling need not be beneﬁcial
for any precision of the signal.
JEL: D44, D82
Keywords: asymmetric auction, ﬁrst-price auction, signaling
1 Introduction
Can it be beneﬁcial to reveal some information about one’s own valuation to another
bidder in a ﬁrst-price auction with private values? On the ﬁrst glance, the answer seems
to be an obvious no: one bidder receives additional information while the revealing bidder’s
information level stays the same. In principle, the informed bidder should be able to use
this information to his own advantage and take away part of the proﬁt of the revealing
bidder. On the second glance however, things are not so clear: a bidder wants to appear
weak in the eyes of his opponent, such that the opponent tries to proﬁt from this weakness
by reducing his bid. This increases the chances of winning for the bidder who reveals to be
weak. Of course, there is also an opposing eﬀect if a bidder appears strong. It is the goal
of this paper to characterize circumstances under which it is proﬁtable (or not proﬁtable)
to release an informative public signal while learning one’s valuation.
∗Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Kaiserstraße 1, 53113 Bonn, Germany, +49-228-
7362173, rieck@uni-bonn.de. I thank Deniz Dizdar, Eric Maskin, Konrad Mierendorﬀ, Benny Moldovanu
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A typical situation where an informative signal could emerge can be found in the context
of procurement auctions. Consider a manufacturer who wants to compete in a ﬁrst-price
procurement auction1 to sell a new product. Before he takes part in the auction he has to
acquire information about his production costs and about the quality of the new product.
Costs and quality depend on the production technology and the costs for buying the neces-
sary components. If the competitors in the auction are able to observe which components
the manufacturer buys for which price, they update their beliefs about quality and price
of the manufacturer’s product. Nevertheless, the manufacturer is the only one who knows
his production technology, while the competitors observe only an informative signal. How
a signal is perceived by the competitors and how their updating works depends very much
on the context, the possible production technologies and the competitor’s beliefs about
these things. If the manufacturer buys the components secretly, no signal is released. Usu-
ally, the manufacturer has the power to decide whether he uses a secret buying process
or whether he makes its results public. For example, if he uses a request for quotation to
acquire the components, the manufacturer provides public information about the speciﬁ-
cations of the components he intends to use. Alternatively, he would be free to secretly
approach possible suppliers and get their oﬀers without revealing any public information.
In our model, two bidders take part in a ﬁrst-price auction with private values. One of the
two bidders has the option to release a signal about his valuation while he learns it. Thus,
he has to commit to releasing the signal before he knows his valuation. In case a signal
is released, the receiving bidder updates his beliefs about the valuation of the sending
bidder. As a consequence, the two bidders bid as in an asymmetric auction. Furthermore,
for each signal realization the resulting beliefs diﬀer and thus do the distributions of the
players’ valuations in the auction. This is the major diﬃculty of this paper: to derive
the expected proﬁt of using these signals, an expectation over the bidders’ payoﬀs of
diﬀerent asymmetric auctions has to be calculated. A closed-form solution for the bidders’
equilibrium strategies is necessary to do this explicitly. Unfortunately, a general closed-
form solution for asymmetric ﬁrst-price auctions is not known.
A crucial element for the success of signaling is the structure of the signals. The results
of this paper show that a very precise signal is not favorable from the sender’s point
of view. Nevertheless, we provide a signaling structure for which signaling is favorable:
such a structure contains some information about the valuation, but is not too precise.
However, in general a signaling precision guaranteeing the success of signaling does not
need to exist: for a diﬀerent structure, we show that signaling is never favorable for the
sender, no matter what the precision is. In particular, one setting where signaling may
be favorable is a simple discrete ﬁrst-price auction setting. Each bidder’s valuation and
1We think of a multi-attribute auction where bids are price-quality combinations evaluated by a scoring
rule. This auction is essentially strategically equivalent to a standard ﬁrst-price auction (see Asker and
Cantillon (2008)). It is thus safe to transfer the results of this paper, which are obtained for standard
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the signal may be either high, medium, or low. The signal is informative in the sense
that it will take the true value with a larger probability than the other two values, and
the remaining two values are taken with equal probability. We show that releasing such
a signal is beneﬁcial for a bidder, as long as the signal is not too precise (the probability
of revealing the true valuation is not close to one). Additionally, we derive the optimal
probability of revealing the true valuation from the sending bidder’s perspective.
Our other results are obtained in a continuous environment: the valuations of the two
bidders are drawn from the same interval. Signals may realize in an interval around the
true valuation. This interval is shifted for diﬀerent realizations. The signal precision is
given by the length of this interval – the shorter the interval, the more precise the signal.
Using only mild assumptions on the signal distributions we give an explicit length of the
interval such that signaling is not beneﬁcial if the signals stem from an interval at most as
long as this length. In our ﬁnal setting, we assume all distributions to be uniform. This is
the only continuous environment where a general explicit solution is known (Kaplan and
Zamir (2007)) – in particular, a solution is needed that allows for diﬀerent supports of the
distributions of the bidders’ valuations. With this signaling structure it is not beneﬁcial
for a bidder to release a signal about his realized valuation, irrespective of the signal
precision.
This problem has not been addressed in the literature so far. The most related paper is
Hoerner and Sahuguet (2007). They explain bluﬃng and jump bidding in a model with two
bidders and an initial stage. In this initial stage, one of the two bidders makes an opening
bid and the other bidder has to match it to start the actual auction following this stage.
A similar feature to our model is the fact that the beliefs of the bidders change depending
on the opening bid and thus an asymmetric auction is played afterward. However, the
opening bid has to be paid in any case. Thus, the signaling happening in the initial stage
has a direct inﬂuence on the payoﬀ. Hoerner and Sahuguet (2007) concentrate mostly
on an all-pay auction for the second stage, but also brieﬂy discuss a discrete ﬁrst-price
auction related to the one we look at in parts of this paper. In a similar framework, Ye
(2007) looks at the concept of indicative bidding. Potential bidders submit non-binding
bids in a stage before the actual auction starts, which is related to the signals in our
model. However, these bids are used to select the participants for the auction and thus
have a direct inﬂuence on the payoﬀs. Furthermore, bidders only learn the highest rejected
non-binding bid, such that the following auction is a symmetric one – and not asymmetric,
as in our case.
Another related line of research is dealing with information acquisition in auctions. Berge-
mann and Valimaki (2002) study eﬃciency in a general mechanism design problem where
agents do not know their type but may acquire a signal about it. More precise signals
are more expensive. In contrast to our model, agents do not learn anything about the
other agents, but only about themselves. Persico (2000) shows that agents acquire more
information about their types in a ﬁrst-price auction compared to a second-price auction.Signaling in First-Price Auctions 4
Compte and Jehiel (2007) compare sealed-bid and dynamic formats, where some bidders
are informed and others are uninformed. In their model, more information is acquired in
the dynamic format, which goes along with a higher revenue for the seller.
Furthermore, our paper is connected to the literature on information disclosure by the
seller. Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that a seller wants to disclose public information
which is aﬃliated with the buyers’ types. Eso and Szentes (2007) give a similar result
when information is given to the bidders privately by the seller. Board (2009) studies the
English auction where the seller may be worse oﬀ in some cases when releasing information.
Looking for the optimal auction, in Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) the seller has full
control how the buyers learn their types. Finally, Kaplan and Zamir (2000) explore the
role of commitment.
The main diﬃculty of this paper lies in solving an asymmetric auction. We use the explicit
solution for two bidders with uniform distributions and a general support by Kaplan and
Zamir (2007). Plum (1992) provides the diﬀerential equations characterizing a general
solution when the support of both bidders’ distributions has the same lower bound. He
also provides an explicit solution for power distributions. Numerical solutions are provided
by Gayle and Richard (2008) and the general questions of uniqueness and existence are
examined by Maskin and Riley (2000a, 2000b, 2003) and Lebrun (1999, 2006).
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce signaling in a discrete ﬁrst-
price auction. The general model with continuous typespaces is studied in Section 3 and
a special case of this model with uniform distributions is given in Section 4. We conclude
in Section 5. We derive the equilibrium for a discrete asymmetric auction in Appendix A
and proofs are given in Appendix B.
2 Signaling in a Discrete Environment
We consider a ﬁrst-price auction with two bidders, i = 1,2, and discrete valuations vi ∈
V := {0,1,2}. The valuations are independently distributed and private information of
the bidders. fi(vi) is the probability that valuation vi is realized for bidder i. Bidder 1 may
send a signal s ∈ S := {0,1,2} = V about his realized valuation. The signal is common
knowledge to both agents. The decision whether to send a signal or not is made before
he knows his valuation. For a given v1 ∈ V , we denote the probability of sending a signal
value of s by h(s|v1). As the signaling should reveal some information about the true
realization, we assume that h(v1|v1) > f1(v1) and for s  = v1 we assume h(s|v1) < f1(v1).
Consequently, bidder 2 updates his beliefs about bidder 1’s true valuation to the posteriors
g(v1|s) according to
g(v1|s) =
h(s|v1)   f1(v1)
 2
j=0 h(s|j)   f1(j)
. (1)
As a result, an asymmetric auction is played. To be able to study the consequences of
signaling in a ﬁrst-price auction, we need to know some properties of the equilibriumSignaling in First-Price Auctions 5
in this asymmetric auction. By Proposition 2 in Maskin and Riley (2000b) we know
that a monotonic equilibrium exists in this setting if a Vickrey tie-breaking rule is used.
According to this rule, ties are broken by performing a Vickrey auction among the bidders
with the same bid. The resulting payment of the Vickrey tie-breaking auction has to be
paid on top of the winning bid of the actual ﬁrst-price auction. Ties in the Vickrey auction
are broken by randomizing with equal probability. This kind of tie-breaking rule ensures
that in equilibrium a bidder with a higher valuation may submit the same bid as another
bidder with a lower valuation and still win the auction with probability one (while two
bidders with the same valuation and the same bid win with equal probability). We assume
a Vickrey tie-breaking rule in the following and concentrate on monotonic equilibria. The
detailed derivation of the equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies, is given in Appendix
A.
For concreteness, when studying signaling we assume that the a priori-distribution of
both bidders’ valuations is uniform, fi(vi) = 1
3 for i = 1,2 and vi ∈ V . Furthermore, we
assume that signaling is of the following form: both signal realizations not meeting the true
valuation are equally likely, h(s|v1) = h(s′|v1) < h(v1|v1) for s  = s′  = v1  = s. Additionally,
the probability of sending a signal containing the true valuation, the signal precision r, is
assumed to be the same irrespective of the valuation. Hence, for all v1,v′
1 ∈ V it holds that
r := h(v1|v1) = h(v′
1|v′
1). Consequently, the posterior in (1) becomes g(v1|s) = h(s|v1), as
 2
j=0 h(s|j) = 1.
With the help of Proposition 16 in Appendix A we are able to calculate the expected
revenue of using signals with precision r, πs
1(r). For each possible signal realization, diﬀer-
ent posteriors arise, and hence essentially a diﬀerent asymmetric auction is played. The
detailed proﬁt of the bidders is derived in Appendix B, the overall proﬁt is summarized
in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Bidder 1’s expected proﬁt in this auction setting when he uses signals with






















3 + 32r − 3r2 + (1 + r)
√
9 + 78r + 9r2
3 − 3r +
√
9 + 78r + 9r2 .
Next, we derive the optimal signal precision r from bidder 1’s perspective. This is done
by maximizing bidder 1’s expected proﬁt as given in Lemma 1. We use the short notation
a :=
√
9 + 78r + 9r2 and b :=
√
13 − 12r. Then, the ﬁrst order condition amounts to
(54 + 18b)r4 + (375 − 6ab + 105b − 18a)r3 − (9ab + 47a + 713 + 519b)r2
ab(−3 + 3r − a)2
+
(76
3 a + 107b − 12ab + 245)r + 13a + 11ab + 33b + 39
ab(−3 + 3r − a)2 = 0 (2)
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Theorem 2 The optimal signaling precision r∗ in the discrete auction model is given by
the solution to (2), with r∗ ≈ 0.5462. Signaling is beneﬁcial for all r fulﬁlling 1
3 < r < r′
with r′ being the larger solution of πs
1(r′) − 4
9 = 0. This yields r′ ≈ 0.7572.
Proof r∗ ≈ 0.5462 is the unique solution to the ﬁrst order condition (2). We furthermore
need to show that it is in fact associated with a maximum: by continuity of the left hand
side of (2) the uniqueness of the solution yields that a local maximum is a global maximum
as well. Furthermore, a numerical calculation as in Figure 1 shows that there are r-values
above and below r∗ leading to a lower proﬁt than r∗. Because of the continuity this is
suﬃcient to show that r∗ is a local maximum, and hence a global maximum.
To show the second part of the theorem, we note that the proﬁt of using no signals (or
signaling with a precision of r = 1
3) yields an expected proﬁt of 4
9 for bidder 1. By our






and monotonically decreasing on (r∗,1). Hence, the zeros of πs
1(r)− 4
9
describe the boundaries of the interval for which signaling is beneﬁcial. πs
1(r)− 4
9 has two
zeros, the lower one being 1
3 and the larger one being r′ ≈ 0.7572. ￿
Figure 1: Expected proﬁt of bidder 1 depending on the signaling precision.
As illustrated by Figure 1, the expected revenue of the signaling bidder is increasing as
soon as informative signaling is introduced. There is a unique optimal signaling precision
given the signaling structure we use. Furthermore, a general pattern of signaling is already
visible here: if signaling gets too precise, it is not beneﬁcial any more. Particularly, if
the precision is very high, the revenue decrease is substantial. Nevertheless, as shown in
Theorem 2, signaling is beneﬁcial for quite a wide range of parameters.
If we increase the number of possible valuations in the set V , this basic insight does not
change. In principle, the same analysis can be repeated for any number of valuations.
In the natural extension of our example, the ex ante distribution of types is uniform,
the average value stays the same and the signaling structure does not change: the signal
takes the true value with a high probability and the remaining values with a smallerSignaling in First-Price Auctions 7
probability, which is equal across all remaining types. However, a general statement is
diﬃcult to make, as we do not have an explicit general characterization of the equilibrium
with n discrete types. We thus limit the explicit analysis to this small example and omit
the detailed characterization of signaling with other numbers of types. Qualitatively, a
basic analysis shows that the revenue without signaling is decreasing in the number of
types, and it suggests that the interval of precisions for which signaling is proﬁtable gets
shorter in absolute and relative terms. The same is true for the maximum gain of signaling,
which is achieved by using the optimal signaling precision. However, it is not clear how the
proﬁtability of signaling will develop in the limit for a large number of discrete types. Note
that the shape of the signaling distribution becomes ﬂatter with an increasing number
of types – it is likely that a more peak-shaped form of the signals, like in the original
three-type example, keeps up the proﬁtability of signaling. Nevertheless, for the reasons
mentioned above, we cannot prove this type of general statements for larger numbers of
types.
3 Signaling in a Continuous Environment
We now introduce signaling when the agents have continuous type spaces. Valuations
vi are independently drawn from an interval V = [v, ¯ v] and are private information of
the bidders. Fi(vi) is the cumulative distribution function of bidder i’s valuation with
associated strictly positive density fi(vi). Bidder 1 may send a signal s ∈ S = [v1−d,v1+d]
about his realized valuation, with d ∈ R+. The signal is common knowledge to both agents.
We call d the precision of the signal. As in the discrete case, the decision whether to send
a signal or not is made before the bidder learns his valuation. Given that a valuation
v1 is realized, the conditional distribution of the signal s with precision d is denoted by
Hd(s|v1) and the corresponding density by hd(s|v1). Note that the signals may be up to
d higher (respectively lower) than the actual maximal (minimal) possible valuation.
After receiving s, bidder 2 correctly updates his beliefs that bidder 1’s valuation is dis-
tributed on [max{v,s − d},min{¯ v,s + d}] =: [s(s,d), ¯ s(s,d)] according to a cumulative
posterior distribution function Gd(v1|s) with strictly positive density gd(v1|s). We write s
and ¯ s in short for s(s,d) and ¯ s(s,d) where the reference to s and d is clear. The overall
expected proﬁt of using signals is denoted by πs, if no signals are used the expected proﬁt
is π. The expected proﬁt of bidder 1, when he has valuation v1 and a signal s has realized,
is denoted by πd(v1|s). As lower signal realizations lead to lower beliefs of bidder 2 and
thus lower equilibrium bids with a higher proﬁt of bidder 1, we concentrate on signaling
structures fulﬁlling the following assumption, which is true for example for the uniform
signaling presented in Section 4 (see Proposition 11).
Assumption 1 Lower signal realizations increase the proﬁt: πd(v1|s) is weakly decreasing
in s given ﬁxed values of v1 and d.Signaling in First-Price Auctions 8
Note that in the current section we do not further restrict the signal to take a speciﬁc form.
Its informativeness comes from the fact that the true valuation of bidder 1 is determined
by the signal with a precision of d.
Maskin and Riley (2000b) showed that in such a setting a pure-strategy equilibrium of
the ﬁrst-price auction with monotonic bid functions exists. We denote the monotonic
equilibrium bidding strategy of agent i in case no signal is revealed by βi(vi). In case
the signal realization is s and the signal precision is d, we denote the strategy of agent i
by βi(vi|s,d). We focus on undominated equilibrium strategies and thus make use of the
following assumption, similar to Maskin and Riley (2003):
Assumption 2 Bidder i never bids more than his type vi in equilibrium.
Adapting a lemma of Maskin and Riley (2003) to our context, we can characterize the
bid of the lowest possible type of bidder 1. Note that this lowest possible type depends
on the signal realization.
Lemma 3 If Assumption 2 holds, for any d ∈ R and any possible signal realization s,
the lowest possible type s(s,d) of bidder 1 has an equilibrium bid of
b∗(s(s,d)) = β1(s(s,d)|s,d) = maxargmax
b
F2(b)(s(s,d) − b).
Note that in case s(s,d) = v, b∗(s(s,d)) = v holds. The following simple lemma shows
that the highest possible type of bidder 1 always wins the auction:
Lemma 4 The highest type ¯ s wins the auction with probability 1 in equilibrium.

















  (v1 − b∗(v1))f1(v1)dv1,
then it is more proﬁtable for bidder 1 not to reveal additional information about his valu-
ation than revealing a signal s with precision d.
Proof Consider the lowest possible valuation of bidder 1, s, with an equilibrium proﬁt of
πd(s|s). Furthermore, recall from Lemma 4 that the highest type wins the auction with
probability 1. In equilibrium, it is not proﬁtable for s to imitate the bidding behavior of
the highest type. Hence, it holds that
πd(s|s) ≥ s − β1(¯ s|s,d).
We now compare the proﬁt of the lowest and the highest type:
πd(¯ s|s) − πd(s|s) ≤ (s + d − β1(¯ s|s,d)) − (s − d − β1(¯ s|s,d))
= 2d. (3)Signaling in First-Price Auctions 9
For a signal s, any type v1 ∈ [s, ¯ s] makes a proﬁt
πd(v1|s) ≤ πd(v1|v1 − d) (4)
≤ πd(s(v1 − d,d)|v1 − d) + 2d (5)
≤ πd(v1|v1 + d) + 2d. (6)
Here, (4) holds by Assumption 1 and (5) holds by using (3) as v1 = ¯ s(v1 − d,d). Finally,
(6) follows directly from Lemma 3: the proﬁt of the lowest type given there is obviously
increasing in the value of the lowest type. Clearly, this increase in proﬁt applies here as
v1 = s(v1 + d,d) ≥ s(v1 − d,d).
As a consequence, we can derive a bound on the expected proﬁt bidder 1 makes in case




  ¯ v
v




  ¯ v
v
f1(v1)




  ¯ v
v
f1(v1)
  ¯ v+d
v−d
(πd(v1|v1 + d) + 2d)hd(s|v1)dsdv1
=
  ¯ v
v
f1(v1)(πd(v1|v1 + d) + 2d)




  ¯ v
v
f1(v1)(πd(v1|v1 + d) + 2d)   1dv1
=
  ¯ v
v
f1(v1)πd(v1|v1 + d)dv1 + 2d
=
  ¯ v
v
f1(v1)F2(b∗(v1))(v1 − b∗(v1))dv1 + 2d. (7)
The last line holds by Lemma 3, as v1 is the lowest possible type given a signal v1+d and
wins exactly against all opponent’s types that are lower than his bid.
Now suppose to the contrary that revealing a signal s with precision d is more proﬁtable
than not revealing such a signal. Given that no signal is revealed, consider the following
strategy β
+
1 of bidder 1: if his type realization is v1 ∈ [v, ¯ v], he plays as if a signal v1 + d
was realized such that v1 is the lowest possible type given this signal. By Lemma 3 we
therefore get β
+
1 (v1) = b∗(v1). Our proof now proceeds as follows: we show that β
+
1 would
be a proﬁtable deviation for bidder 1 in comparison to his equilibrium strategy without
signal realization, β1.
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f1(v1)dv1 + π − 2d. (8)
The last line holds because by assumption, the expected proﬁt given no signaling takes
place, π, is smaller than the expected proﬁt with signaling, πs ≥ π. If we rearrange (8)
we get the following:
π
+ − π ≥


























1 (v1) = b∗(v1), we can see that the deviation to β
+
1 is proﬁtable if











(v1 − b∗(v1))f1(v1)dv1 ≥ 2d, (9)
leading to π+ − π ≥ 0. In these cases, we get a contradiction to the fact that β1 is an
equilibrium strategy. Thus, our initial assumption that revealing a signal with a precision
d as in (9) must have been false and bidder 1 prefers not to reveal a signal. ￿
The theorem shows that a bidder never likes to use a signal that is too precise in the
sense of d being very small. This bound on d we derived is independent of the precise
distribution used for signaling (as long as Assumption 1 is fulﬁlled). However, it depends
on the original distributions of the bidder’s valuations. Note that the result does not say
whether signaling is proﬁtable or not for higher values of d. In the following example, we
calculate the size of the bound for a uniform distribution.
Example 6 Suppose valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution on [v, ¯ v] = [0,1],
hence Fi(vi) = vi and fi(vi) = 1. It is commonly known that equilibrium bids in a
ﬁrst-price auction are then given by βi(vi) =
vi
2 . Furthermore, by Lemma 3 we know
b∗(v1) = maxargmaxb F2(b)(v1−b) = b(v1−b) =
v1
2 . This ﬁxes the bound on the precision


































Thus, for a signaling interval length smaller than 2d = 1
12 it is not proﬁtable to make use
of the signals.
4 Signaling via Uniform Distributions
We now consider the only class of distributions for which a complete characterization of
equilibrium strategies in the asymmetric auction exists: the uniform distribution. This isSignaling in First-Price Auctions 11
a special case of the general continuous environment in Section 3. The aim of this section
is to analyze the proﬁtability of signaling for all possible signal precisions d. Ex ante, the
valuations for both bidders are identically and independently distributed according to a
uniform distribution on [v, ¯ v]. Accordingly, the cumulative distribution function F is given
by F(v) =
v−v
¯ v−v and its density by f(v) = 1
¯ v−v. Bidder 1 has the option to ex ante commit
to sending a signal s with a precision d after his valuation v1 is realized. Speciﬁcally,
the signal s is distributed uniformly on [v1 − d,v1 + d]. The corresponding cumulative
distribution function is given by Hd(s|v1) =
s−(v1−d)
2d and its density by hd(s|v1) = 1
2d.
Hence, from an ex ante-perspective, we can derive the density hd(s) for a realization of
signal s by the law of total probability:
hd(s) =
  ¯ s(s,d)
s(s,d)
f(v1)hd(s|v1)dv1 =
  ¯ s(s,d)
s(s,d)
1





¯ s(s,d) − s(s,d)
(¯ v − v)2d
(10)
After observing a signal s, bidder 2 updates his belief to the posterior probability dis-













¯ s(s,d) − s(s,d)
.
Thus, the posterior is distributed uniformly on [s(s,d), ¯ s(s,d)]. Given a signal realization
s, the two bidders face the situation of an asymmetric auction with uniform distributions.
The two bidders play as if bidder 1’s value had been drawn uniformly from [s(s,d), ¯ s(s,d)]
and bidder 2’s value from [v, ¯ v]. We denote the expected proﬁt of bidder 1 in this auction
by π1(s,d). The general inverse bidding strategies for this asymmetric auction have been
derived by Kaplan and Zamir (2007) and can be found in Appendix B. Again, we denote
the bidding strategy of bidder i by βi(vi|s,d) as the bid depends on the realized valuation
vi, the realized signal s and the precision of the signal d. For notational simplicity, we
write βi(vi) whenever s and d are ﬁxed. The expected proﬁt is given as follows, using the
substitution (β1)
−1 (b) = v1 with boundaries b(s,d) = β1(s(s,d)) and ¯ b(s,d) = β1(¯ s(s,d)):
π1(s,d) =
  ¯ s(s,d)
s(s,d)























¯ s(s,d) − s(s,d)
db
=




1 (b) − b)  
β
−1
2 (b) − v







¯ s(s,d) − s(s,d)
db. (11)





1(v, ¯ v,d) =
  ¯ v+d
v−d
hd(s)π1(s,d)ds. (12)
Our main goal is to analyze whether signaling is proﬁtable. To simplify the analysis, we
ﬁrst formulate a series of lemmas enabling us to restrict attention on F being uniform onSignaling in First-Price Auctions 12
[0,1]. We formulate these lemmas in the general framework with bidders having valuations
distributed on [vi, ¯ vi]. The proofs for all lemmas are given in Appendix B.
Lemma 7 Suppose the supports of the valuations [vi, ¯ vi] are transformed to [v
+
i , ¯ v
+
i ] =
[αvi + k,α¯ vi + k] with α,k ∈ R+. Then, the inverse bidding strategies are transformed
accordingly: b
+ = αb + k, ¯ b+ = α¯ b + k and for all αb + k =: b+ ∈ [b





 −1 (b+) = αβ
−1
i (b) + k.
Making use of this result, we can make a statement about a bidder’s payoﬀs depending
on the distribution parameters. Denote bidder i’s payoﬀ by πi(v1, ¯ v1,v2, ¯ v2).
Lemma 8 Given the situation of Lemma 7, the expected proﬁt changes according to
πi(v
+




2 , ¯ v
+
2 ) = πi(αv1 + k,α¯ v1 + k,αv2 + k,α¯ v2 + k) = απi(v1, ¯ v1,v2, ¯ v2).
Transforming [v, ¯ v] to [v+, ¯ v+] := [αv+k,α¯ v+k] and the signal precision d to d+ := αd, it
is immediate to see that the bounds for valuations possibly generating a signal s+ = αs+k
change according to s+(s+,d+) = αs(s,d) + k and ¯ s+(s+,d+) = α¯ s + k. We can apply
this to get the last lemma:








1(αv + k,α¯ v + k,αd) = απ
s
1(v, ¯ v,d).
We can summarize our ﬁndings to state the following proposition:
Proposition 10 Signaling is not proﬁtable for valuations drawn from [v, ¯ v] if and only if
it is not proﬁtable for valuations drawn from [0,1],
π
s
1(v, ¯ v,(¯ v − v)d) < π1(v, ¯ v,v, ¯ v) ⇐⇒ π
s
1(0,1,d) < π1(0,1,0,1).




⇐⇒ (¯ v − v)π
s
1(0,1,d) < (¯ v − v)π1(0,1,0,1)
⇐⇒ π
s
1(v, ¯ v,(¯ v − v)d) < π1(v, ¯ v,v, ¯ v). ￿
The following proposition shows that a better (lower) signal realization leads to higher
proﬁts and thus Assumption 1 made in Section 3 holds in this signaling structure.
Proposition 11 Suppose bidder 1 has a valuation v1 drawn from a uniform distribution
on the support [v1, ¯ v1] with v1 ≥ 0 and bidder 2’s valuation is drawn uniformly from [0,1].
Then, the proﬁt of bidder 1 with valuation v1 is weakly lower if v1 is a realization from a
uniform distribution on [v
+
1 , ¯ v
+
1 ] with v
+
1 ≥ v1 and ¯ v
+
1 ≥ ¯ v1 with one of the two inequalities
being strict.Signaling in First-Price Auctions 13
The following theorem leads to the main result of this section.
Theorem 12 For d ≥
¯ v−v
2 , the expected proﬁt πs






1(v, ¯ v,d) = π1(v, ¯ v,v, ¯ v).
Proof By Proposition 10 it is suﬃcient to show the results for [v, ¯ v] = [0,1]. The expected
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=:˜ c
˜ c is constant, and thus limd→∞ πs
1(v, ¯ v,d) = π1(v, ¯ v,v, ¯ v). A calculation of ˜ c shows ˜ c ≈
−0.03 < 0. Hence, πs
1(0,1,d) is increasing. ￿
This theorem already proofs part of our main result:
Result 13 For any precision of signals d > 0, signaling is less proﬁtable:
π
s
1(v, ¯ v,d) < π1(v, ¯ v,v, ¯ v).
This result is a generalization of Theorem 12 (for the case d ≥
¯ v−v
2 ) and Example 6 as
an application of Theorem 5 (for the case d ≤
¯ v−v
24 ). For the remaining parameter values,
we give a proof in Appendix B. The proof uses the assertion that an increase in the
upper or lower end point of the support of bidder 1’s uniform distribution also increases
his expected proﬁt. We do not provide a formal proof of this assertion. Nevertheless, a
numerical calculation shows directly that the proﬁt is increasing in d for all values in d
and the result thus holds.
5 Conclusion
We showed that a bidder in a ﬁrst-price auction might voluntarily commit to revealing an
informative signal about his valuation. However, whether he does so or not depends onSignaling in First-Price Auctions 14
several parameters, particularly the distribution and precision of the signals. As a general
pattern, bidders have no incentive to reveal an informative signal if it is very precise. In a
setting with only three possible valuations – high, medium or low – we derived the optimal
signal and the range of precision for which signaling is beneﬁcial. The analysis relies on a
closed-form solution of the equilibrium strategies. Such an analysis is in principle feasible
for other discrete sets of valuations and other shapes of signaling distributions as well.
However, general statements for higher numbers of valuations are diﬃcult to make without
an explicit general characterization of discrete asymmetric equilibria. Nevertheless, the
key insight can already be gleaned from the small example with three valuations: the
voluntary release of an informative signal about one’s own valuation can be beneﬁcial.
It is likely that a similar shaped distribution of signals as in the discrete case would also
make signaling proﬁtable in the continuous setting. The distributions in such a family
should be single-peaked on the same interval, diﬀering in the position of the peak. Un-
fortunately, the explicit equilibrium strategies for a family of signals having that peaked
shape is not known so far – and without knowledge of the explicit strategies it is diﬃcult
to estimate the expected revenue, as the auctions played diﬀer with each signal realiza-
tion. Hence, we chose to introduce informativeness of the signals by altering the support
of the possible signals depending on the realized valuation. This enables us to get both,
a result for a general class of distributions on a restricted set of signal precisions and a
result for all signal precisions using uniform distributions. In these settings, signaling is
not proﬁtable for a bidder.
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A Appendix: Equilibrium of a Discrete Asymmetric
Auction
We derive the necessary equilibrium properties of the asymmetric auction used in Section
2: a ﬁrst-price auction with two bidders, i = 1,2, with private values v1,v2 ∈ V =
{0,1,2}, independently drawn according to the probabilities pv1 and qv2 respectively, using
a Vickrey tie-breaking rule. Note that compared to Section 2, we change the notation of
the probabilities. This is to avoid confusion: depending on the speciﬁc probabilities in the
asymmetric auction, bidder 1 in Section 2 may take the role of either bidder 1 or bidder
2 in this appendix and a diﬀerent notation minimizes the risk of mixing them up.Signaling in First-Price Auctions 16
To start with the equilibrium analysis, ﬁrst note that the equilibrium is in mixed strategies:
Lemma 14 In this discrete ﬁrst-price auction with Vickrey tie-breaking rule no pure-
strategy equilibrium exists.
Proof Consider two bidders with valuation 2 and suppose there is a (monotonic) pure-
strategy equilibrium in which they bid diﬀerently. Then, the bidder submitting the strictly
higher bid has an incentive to undercut his own bid such that he decreases his payment
but still wins for sure. This cannot happen in equilibrium. In the same way, if both bidders
submit the same highest bid, both of them have an incentive to slightly overcut the other
bidder – the additional payment can be made arbitrary low, while the winning probability
will make a ﬁxed jump upwards (with the new bid, the bidder will always win the auction
while he lost with positive probability before). ￿
A mixed equilibrium has the following structure:
Lemma 15 In a mixed equilibrium of this discrete ﬁrst-price auction with Vickrey tie-
breaking rule
1. both bidders submit the same maximum bid b∗;
2. there cannot be an interval (b′,b′′) with 0 < b′ < b′′ < b∗ in which any of the two
bidders does not submit a bid;
3. bidders do not use atoms in (0,b∗].
Proof To prove the ﬁrst part, we use the fact that for a given valuation bidders have to
be indiﬀerent between all bids they possibly submit. Hence, the maximum bid b∗ has to
be the same for both bidders – otherwise, the bidder with the higher one could proﬁtably
deviate from his maximum bid by slightly undercutting. For the second part, suppose
that such an interval (b′,b′′) in which bidder i does not submit a bid would exist. Then,
bidder j would not submit bids on this interval either and hence no bids at all would be
submitted on this interval. Suppose bidder j does not place an atom on b′′. Then, bidder
i had a proﬁtable deviation from his bid b′′ by deviating to a bid in the interval (b′,b′′),
lowering the price to pay in case of winning without losing any winning probability. If
bidder j has an atom on b′′, then either bidder i has no atom, and the argument above
applies for bidder j – or bidder i has an atom as well. In this case, both bidders necessarily
have a positive winning probability with their bid b′′ and make proﬁt using it2 (otherwise,
they would have a proﬁtable deviation in the interval (b′,b′′)). However, as a consequence
they have a proﬁtable deviation by slightly increasing their bid, making a jump upwards
in the winning probability on the expense of an arbitrarily low increase in payment. This
cannot be the case in equilibrium. Finally, we note that bidders do not use atoms in (0,b∗]:
2Note that there is a positive mass of bidders with valuation 0 who always submit a bid of 0.Signaling in First-Price Auctions 17
as already shown above, it is not possible that both bidders place an atom on the same
bid in equilibrium. Similarly, if only bidder i places an atom on some b′ ∈ (0,b∗], bidder
j has an incentive to bid slightly above b′ instead of bidding in an interval (b′ − ε,b′) for
ε small enough. This increases the winning probability by at least the mass of the atom,
while the payment is only increased by at most ε. Consequently, this atom cannot be part
of an equilibrium in case vj > b′. However, vj = b′ cannot be part of an equilibrium as
well, as bidder j would earn a proﬁt arbitrarily close to 0 with the bid b′ − ε, while he
could get a ﬁxed positive amount by simply bidding 0. We can thus conclude that bidders
possibly only use atoms when bidding 0. ￿
Hence, we look for equilibria with bids on the whole interval [0,b∗]. Additionally, we
assume w.l.o.g. that bidder 1 has a higher probability of having valuation 2, p2 ≥ q2.
The lowest possible equilibrium bid of bidder i with valuation vi is denoted by bi(vi), and
bidder 1’s winning probability with his bid b1(2) is q′. Similarly, his winning probability
with a bid b1(1) = 0 is given by q′′ ≥ q0. p′′ ≥ p0 is the respective probability for bidder 2.
We are now ready to derive some necessary equilibrium conditions. A bidder with val-
uation 2 has the opportunity to win against all others for sure by submitting a bid of
b∗. Then, he makes a proﬁt of 2 − b∗. All other bids submitted with valuation 2 have to
generate the same proﬁt. Consequently, in equilibrium both bidders mix symmetrically
on [max{b1(2),b2(2)},b∗]. Hence, as we assumed that p2 ≥ q2, it holds that b1(2) ≤ b2(2)
and the ﬁrst equilibrium condition is given by
2 − b
∗ = (1 − q
2)(2 − b2(2)), (13)
as bidder 1 wins the auction with a bid of b2(2) exactly against all bidder 2 types with a
valuation of 1 or 0. If p2 is strictly larger than q2, bidder 1’s lowest bid fulﬁlls b1(2) < b2(2),
and bidder 1 with valuation 2 sometimes loses against bidder 2 who has valuation 1. We
get a second condition involving bidder 1’s winning probability with his bid b1(2), q′:
2 − b
∗ = q
′(2 − b1(2)). (14)
Similarly, bidder 2 with valuation 1 has to be indiﬀerent between submitting a bid of b2(2)
and b1(2) according to
(1 − q
2)(1 − b2(2)) = (1 − p
2)(1 − b1(2)). (15)
Additionally, he gets the same proﬁt by submitting a bid of b2(1) = 0, having a winning
probability of p′′ ≥ p0:
(1 − p
2)(1 − b1(2)) = p
′′(1 − 0). (16)
Bidder 1 with valuation 1 is indiﬀerent between submitting a bid of b1(2) or b1(1) = 0,
winning with probability q′′ ≥ q0 in the latter case:
q
′(1 − b1(2)) = q
′′(1 − 0). (17)Signaling in First-Price Auctions 18
Note that due to the Vickrey tie-breaking rule, a bidder with valuation 1 wins against
all opponents with valuation 0 in case he submits a bid of 0. Furthermore, at least one
of p′′ = p0 and q′′ = q0 is always true: it cannot be the case that both bidders bid 0
with a positive probability when having valuation 1 – facing a bidder with the same
valuation, tie-breaking will let them win only in half of the cases. Increasing the bid
slightly would hence be a proﬁtable deviation. Given these additional conditions, we have
a linear equation system with ﬁve equations and ﬁve unknowns, pinning down the bidding
intervals for the diﬀerent valuations as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 16 In this discrete asymmetric auction setting with p2 ≥ q2, bidder i’s
equilibrium bids have the following properties:
1. With valuation 2, bidder i mixes his bids on [bi(2),b∗];
2. with valuation 1, bidder i mixes his bids on [0,bi(2)], with possibly a mass point on
0;
3. with valuation 0, bidder i bids 0.
The boundaries of the bidding intervals and the probability of bidding 0 are given as follows:
1. In case p′′ = p0
b
∗ = 1 − p
0 + q
2
b1(2) = 1 −
p0
1 − p2






1 + p0 − q2
1 − p2 + p0.
2. In case q′′ = q0
b
∗ = 2 − q
0 − q
′
b1(2) = 1 −
q0
q′















+ (1 − p2)q0.Signaling in First-Price Auctions 19
Proof We start with the case p′′ = p0. It follows directly from (16) that
b1(2) = 1 −
p0
1 − p2.
Plugging this into (15), we get












= 1 − p
0 + q
2.
The winning probabilities follow from (14) (for q′) and (17) (for q′′):
q
′ =





(1 + p0 − q2)(1 − p2)




1 + p0 − q2
1 − p2 + p0.
Next, we focus on the case q′′ = q0. Starting with (17), we get
b1(2) = 1 −
q0
q′ . (18)
Combining (13) and (14) we can write
b2(2) = 2 −
q′








1 − q2 . (19)





1 − q2 − 1
 







1   q












+ (1 − p2)q0.
Plugging q′ in (18) and (19) yields the expressions stated in the proposition. (13) ﬁxes b∗
according to
b
∗ = 2 − (1 − q
2)  
q′ + q0
1 − q2 = 2 − q
0 − q
′.
Finally, according to (16) we get
p
′′ = (1 − p
2)  
q0
q′ . ￿Signaling in First-Price Auctions 20
Particularly, the proposition allows us to pin down the equilibrium proﬁt of the bidders,
which is all we need for calculating the proﬁt of signaling. Hence, there is no need for a
full characterization of equilibrium strategies in this place.
Finally, we give a characterization which of the cases p′′ = p0 or q′′ = q0 in Proposition 16
is the relevant one for some speciﬁc probability distributions. This lemma will be useful
in the next section.
Lemma 17 In Proposition 16, the case p′′ = p0 is relevant if p0 > q0. Furthermore, the
case q′′ = q0 is relevant if either p2 > 1/3, p1 = p0 =
1−p2
2 , q2 = q1 = q0 = 1
3 or if
p2 = p1 = p0 = 1
3, q0 > 1
3, q1 = q2 =
1−q0
2 .
Proof First note that 1 − p2 ≤ q′: substituting the left-hand side of (14) with the right-











2 − b1(2) − 2b2(2) + b1(2)b2(2)
2 − 2b1(2) − b2(2) + b1(2)b2(2)
.
As
2 − b1(2) − 2b2(2) + b1(2)b2(2) ≤ 2 − 2b1(2) − b2(2) + b1(2)b2(2) ⇐⇒ b1(2) ≤ b2(2),
we know that 1 − p2 ≤ q′ ⇐⇒ b1(2) ≤ b2(2), while the latter is true by our initial as-
sumption p2 ≥ q2. Consequently, by comparing (16) and (17) we get the general condition
p′′ ≤ q′′. Hence, if p0 > q0 is fulﬁlled, it can never be the case that q′′ = q0 because it
would yield the contradiction q′′ = q0 < p0 ≤ p′′.
In the case p2 > 1/3, p1 = p0 =
1−p2
2 , q2 = q1 = q0 = 1
3 the above argumentation cannot
be applied as q0 > p0. We thus take a diﬀerent approach and show that if p′′ = p0 were
true, q′′ ≥ q0 = 1



















































which is true by our assumption.
Similarly, the case p2 = p1 = p0 = 1
3, q0 > 1
3, q1 = q2 =
1−q0

































which is true in the case we are analyzing. ￿Signaling in First-Price Auctions 21
B Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
First note that each signal realizes with probability 1
3. We will thus proceed by calculating
the expected proﬁt given a signal realization s ∈ S, denoted by π1(s,r), and then take the
average of these proﬁts. Suppose that a signal s = 2 is received. Then, g(2|2) = r > 1
3 =
f2(2) and bidder 1 is associated with the p-probabilities in Proposition 16, while bidder
2 is associated with the q’s. Hence, the two bidders are playing an asymmetric auction
with posterior probabilities p2 = r, p1 = p0 = 1−r
2 and q0 = q1 = q2 = 1
3. As we assumed
r > 1
3, Lemma 17 tells us that q′′ = q0 has to hold in Proposition 16. The expected proﬁt
can be calculated according to
π1(2,r) = p
2 (2 − b
∗) + p
1q



































If the signal realizes to s = 1, posteriors are given by g(2|1) = g(0|1) = 1−r
2 , g(1|1) = r
and f2(0) = f2(1) = f2(2) = 1
3. Hence, g(2|1) < f2(2) and in the language of Proposition
16 bidder 1 and bidder 2 switch roles. Consequently, to get π1(1,r) we have to calculate
the proﬁt of the bidder 2-role in Proposition 16 in an asymmetric auction with p0 = p1 =
p2 = 1
3 and q2 = q0 = 1−r
2 , q1 = r. As q0 = 1−r
2 < 1
3 = p0, by Lemma 17 p′′ = p0 holds in
Proposition 16. Thus, we get
π1(1,r) = q





























The last possible signal realization is s = 0. Then, posteriors are g(2|0) = g(1|0) = 1−r
2 ,
g(0|0) = r and f2(0) = f2(1) = f2(2) = 1
3. Again, g(2|0) < f2(2) and bidder 1 takes
the role of bidder 2 when we apply Proposition 16. The according probabilities in the
asymmetric auction are thus given by p0 = p1 = p2 = 1
3 and q2 = q1 = 1−r
2 , q0 = r. Hence,
q′′ = q0 holds and the expected proﬁt in this case amounts to
π1(0,r) = q








































3 + 32r − 3r2 + (1 + r)
√
9 + 78r + 9r2
3 − 3r +
√







(π1(0,r) + π1(1,r) + π1(2,r))
and simplifying yields the result. ￿Signaling in First-Price Auctions 22
Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose ¯ s wins with a probability less than 1 in equilibrium. Then, a set of types of the
opponent with a positive mass must submit the same bid as ¯ s – their bid cannot be higher,
as they had a proﬁtable deviation to a lower bid in this continuous setting otherwise. As
¯ s makes positive proﬁts (this e.g. follows from Lemma 3), he than would have a proﬁtable
deviation by slightly increasing his bid and win with probability 1. This deviation will
increase his proﬁt if the bid increase is chosen small enough, such that the gain in winning
probability makes up for the loss coming from a higher bid. As this proﬁtable deviation
cannot exist in equilibrium, ¯ s must win with probability 1. ￿
Inverse bidding strategies according to Kaplan and Zamir (2007), Proposition 1. We
assume that bidder i’s valuation is uniformly distributed on [vi, ¯ vi] with v2 < v1 and v1 <
2¯ v2 − v2.3 Without the latter regularity assumption, bidder 2 always loses in equilibrium
and the analysis is trivial. Hence, in equilibrium, both bidders have a positive chance of




and ¯ b =




¯ v1 − v1 + ¯ v2 − v2
(20)
If bidder 2 has a value v2 < b we assume that he bids truthfully. For all b ∈ [b,¯ b], the
inverse bid functions β
−1
i (b) are given by
β
−1
1 (b) = v1 +
(v2 − v1)2
(v1 + v2 − 2b)c1e
v2−v1




2 (b) = v2 +
(v2 − v1)2
(v1 + v2 − 2b)c2e
v1−v2





¯ v1−v1 + 4(¯ b − v2)
−2(¯ b − b)
e
v2−v1
2(¯ b−b) and c2 =
(v2−v1)2
¯ v2−v2 + 4(¯ b − v1)




This solution does not cover the case v1 = v2 = v, which was already solved by Griesmer
et al. (1967) in the context of reverse auctions. A generalization is given by Plum (1992)
for the class of power distributions. The inverse bid functions can be written as follows,
for b ∈ [b,¯ b] as in (20):
β
−1
1 (b) = v +
2(b − v)
1 + b2c − 2bcv + cv2 (24)
β
−1
2 (b) = v +
2(b − v)
1 − b2c + 2bcv − cv2. (25)
The constant c is deﬁned by
c =
1
(¯ v1 − v)2 −
1
(¯ v2 − v)2. (26)
3Note that the roles of bidder 1 and 2 are exchanged compared to Kaplan and Zamir (2007) for
consistency reasons with the rest of this paper.Signaling in First-Price Auctions 23
Proof of Lemma 7
We ﬁrst calculate b
+ and ¯ b+ using (20):
b
+ =





+ k = αb + k
¯ b
+ =





α¯ v1 + k − αv1 − k + α¯ v2 + k − αv2 − k
= α




¯ v1 − v1 + ¯ v2 − v2
+ k = α¯ b + k.
Now consider the case v1 < v2. First note, using (23), that the constants c1 and c2 are





α¯ v1+k−αv1−k + 4(α¯ b + k − αv2 − k)





¯ v1−v1 + 4(¯ b − v2)
−2(¯ b − b)
e
v2−v1
2(¯ b−b) = c1.
A similar calculation is true for c2. Hence, we can calculate the inverse bidding function







= αv1 + k +
(αv2 + k − αv1 − k)2
(αv1 + k + αv2 + k − 2(αb + k))c1e
αv2+k−αv1−k





(v1 + v2 − 2b)c1e
v2−v1





1 (b) + k.
Again, the calculation for bidder 2, using (22), is similar.





(α¯ v1 + k − αv − k)2 −
1





(¯ v1 − v)2 −
1











+) = αv + k +
2(αb + k − αv − k)
1 + (αb + k)2 c
α2 − 2(αb + k) c











1 (b) + k.
The inverse bidding strategy for bidder 2 can be derived in the same way using (25). ￿
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Using (11), the proﬁt of bidder 1 for the transformed support can be written as
π1(v
+




2 , ¯ v
+
2 ) =



















































 −1 (αb + k) − αv2 − k
















1 (b) − αb)  
αβ
−1
2 (b) − αv2










α¯ v1 − αv1
  αdb (28)
= α




1 (b) − b)  
β
−1
2 (b) − v2







¯ v1 − v1
db
= απ1(v1, ¯ v1,v2, ¯ v2).






































applied to b+ = αb + k. A similar calculation with changed indices gives the result for
bidder 2. ￿
Proof of Lemma 9







  ¯ v++d+
v+−d+
¯ s+(s+,d+) − s+(s+,d+)











  ¯ v+d
v−d
¯ s+(αs + k,αd) − s+(αs + k,αd)
(α¯ v + k − αv − k)2αd
π1(s
+(αs + k,αd), ¯ s
+(αs + k,αd),αv + k,α¯ v + k)   αds
(29)
=
  ¯ v+d
v−d
α¯ s(s,d) − αs(s,d)
α(¯ v − v)2αd
π1(αs(s,d) + k,α¯ s(s,d) + k,αv + k,α¯ v + k)   αds
= α
  ¯ v+d
v−d
¯ s(s,d) − s(s,d)
(¯ v − v)2d




(29) follows from the substitution s+ = αs + k, (30) from Lemma 8. ￿
Proof of Proposition 11
The proof proceeds in several steps.
First step: the maximum bid increases, ¯ b+ > ¯ b.Signaling in First-Price Auctions 25
We use (20) to calculate the diﬀerence ¯ b+ −¯ b:
¯ b
+ −¯ b =
¯ v
+










1 + 1 − 0
−





¯ v1 − v1 + 1 − 0
=





























      
>0
(¯ v1 − v1 + 1)
      
>0
.
As the denominator is positive, we only need to calculate the sign of the numerator to see
whether ¯ b+ > ¯ b or not:











































































































































¯ v1 (1 − ¯ v1)
 
≥ 0.
The ﬁrst inequality is strict if ¯ v
+
1 > ¯ v1, the second inequality is strict if v
+
1 > v1. As at
least one of these two statements is true by assumption, we get ¯ b+ −¯ b > 0.
Second step: the bids of bidder 2 increase: for all b ∈ [b









First note that β
−1





 −1 (b) < 1 as ¯ b < ¯ b+ by the ﬁrst step. Hence, the
assertion is true at the top. Now assume that the assertion fails for some lower b. Then,
by continuity of the bid functions, there is a largest b∗ in the interior of the interval where









 −1 (b) = β
−1
2 (b)}.
To come to a contradiction, we look at two diﬀerent cases regarding the inverse bid





 −1 (b∗) < β
−1
1 (b∗).
By the ﬁrst-order conditions of the maximization problems of the two bidders, we get


























2 (b) − v2.
4see e.g. Kaplan and Zamir (2007), equation (2)Signaling in First-Price Auctions 26













































 −1 (b∗) < β
−1












 ′ (b∗). This leads to a contradiction: by construction of b∗




















 −1 (b∗) = β
−1
2 (b∗), we get that β
−1















 ′ (b∗) holds, which contradicts the conclusion from above.





 −1 (b∗) ≥ β
−1
1 (b∗) is possible. However, we will come
to a contradiction in this case as well. We make use of an equilibrium condition derived












2 (b) − b
. (32)
We apply this equation to our setting and conclude that at b∗
b∗β
−1




















 −1 (b∗) − v
+














 −1 (b∗) = β
−1



































In case the lower end of the interval strictly increases, v
+




















2 . In case the lower end of the interval
stays the same, v
+





 −1 (b∗) = β
−1
1 (b∗) needs
to hold. We look at the explicit solution of the equilibrium bid functions, (21) and (22)
or, in case v
+
1 = v1 = 0, (24) and (25). Using the fact that b∗ > b





 −1 (b∗) = β
−1
1 (b∗) that respectively c1 = c
+
1 and c2 = c
+
2 or c = c+ need to hold. But
this is not consistent with the true values of these constants – it would e.g. follow that
the bid functions are the same for both intervals. We thus arrived at a contradiction and
ﬁnished the proof of the second step.
Third step: the proﬁt of bidder 1 with valuation v1 is weakly decreasing.
Suppose to the contrary that the expected proﬁt of bidder 1 with valuation v1 is higher
after the shift of the interval. Furthermore, assume b and b+ are such that β
−1










 −1 (b+) ≤ β
−1
2 (b+). Hence, as bidder
2’s valuation is distributed uniformly on [0,1], we conclude that
(v1 − b)β
−1












This would be a proﬁtable deviation for bidder 1 to b+ in the case with the unshifted inter-
val, a contradiction, as bidding b is equilibrium behavior by assumption. This concludes
the proof. ￿
Proof of Result 13





















π1(0,s + d,0,1)ds +
  1−d
d





















We now check for all three summands whether they are increasing or decreasing in d by
using Leibniz’ rule and the assertion that an increase in the upper or lower end point of
the support of bidder 1’s uniform distribution also increases his expected proﬁt. We start






















































π1(1 − 2d − t,1 − t,0,1)
      
<0
dt + π1(0,2d,0,1)   (−2)
< 0.
5Technically, we did not show b+ ≤ ¯ b, and in case b+ > ¯ b the inverse β
−1
2 (b+) is not well deﬁned – no
type of bidder 2 will bid so high. However, a bid of b+ will win with probability 1, and it is thus suﬃcient
to identify β
−1
2 (b+) with the highest possible valuation of bidder 2, which is 1. The inequality is thus
trivially fulﬁlled in this case.Signaling in First-Price Auctions 28



























(1 − t)dt + 2π1(1 − 2d,1,0,1)




To show that πs
1(0,1,d) < π1(0,1,0,1) = 1
6, we calculate the summands for diﬀerent d
values and use the results from above for the values in between. The following table gives
simple (rounded) upper bounds for the values of the summands.
d summand 1 summand 2 summand 3
0.00 0 0.09 0
0.26 0.01 0.06 0.06
0.36 0.02 0.04 0.075
0.44 0.035 0.02 0.09
0.5 0.05 0 0.095
Given the fact that summands one and three are increasing, and summand 2 is decreasing,
we can thus estimate:
• For d ≤ 0.26: πs
1(0,1,d) < 0.01 + 0.09 + 0.06 < 1
6
• For 0.26 ≤ d ≤ 0.36: πs
1(0,1,d) < 0.02 + 0.06 + 0.075 < 1
6
• For 0.36 ≤ d ≤ 0.44: πs
1(0,1,d) < 0.035 + 0.04 + 0.09 < 1
6
• For 0.44 ≤ d ≤ 0.50: πs
1(0,1,d) < 0.05 + 0.02 + 0.095 < 1
6. ￿